The Political Economy of the Carcieri Fix

The Political Economy of the Carcieri Fix

Last week’s hearing on the ongoing question of whether Congress will “fix” the Supreme Court’s Carcieri decision was a different take than earlier hearings, but still completely ignores the elephant in the room.

The first hearings were naked pleas to reverse the Supreme Court’s decision on the grounds that the decision was just plain incorrect. The increased complexity of administration of fee to trust acquisitions for tribes possibly affected by Carcieri and Interior was the backdrop there. Now it is jobs and economic development, truly important factors.

But what was missing, and what likely guarantees there will never be a Carcieri fix, was the big gaming tribes. It is the big gaming tribes that divide Indian country on this question, and even though there are only a dozen, maybe two, in question … and they have an effective veto on a Carcieri fix.

Forget Rhode Island’s concern about having their ridiculously expensive Supreme Court victory stripped away, or some Senators’ concerns about “reservation shopping.” Senators views can be changed, especially when political expediency requires it. But the powerful Indian gaming tribes’ interests are economic. So the hearings are incomplete at best, and maybe a sham at worst, because the real interests can stay quiet on the record.

Intertribal gaming revenue sharing anyone? But even that might not be enough.